An Iranian state-sponsored hacking group associated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has been linked to a spear-phishing campaign targeting journalists, high-profile cyber security experts, and computer science professors in Israel.
“In some of those campaigns, Israeli technology and cyber security professionals were approached by attackers who posed as fictitious assistants to technology executives or researchers through emails and WhatsApp messages,” Check Point said in a report published Wednesday. “The threat actors directed victims who engaged with them to fake Gmail login pages or Google Meet invitations.”
The cybersecurity company attributed the activity to a threat cluster it tracks as Educated Manticore, which overlaps with APT35 (and its sub-cluster APT42), CALANQUE, Charming Kitten, CharmingCypress, Cobalt Illusion, ITG18, Magic Hound, Mint Sandstorm (formerly Phosphorus), Newscaster, TA453, and Yellow Garuda.
The advanced persistent threat (APT) group has a long history of orchestrating social engineering attacks using elaborate lures, approaching targets on various platforms like Facebook and LinkedIn using fictitious personas to trick victims into deploying malware on their systems.
Check Point said it observed a new wave of attacks starting mid-June 2025 following the outbreak of the Iran-Israel war that targeted Israeli individuals using fake meeting decoys, either via emails or WhatsApp messages tailored to the targets. It’s believed that the messages are crafted using artificial intelligence (AI) tools.
One of the WhatsApp messages flagged by the company took advantage of the current geopolitical tensions between the two countries to coax the victim into joining a meeting, claiming they needed their immediate assistance on an AI-based threat detection system to counter a surge in cyber attacks targeting Israel since June 12.
The initial messages, like those observed in previous Charming Kitten campaigns, are devoid of any malicious artifacts and are primarily designed to gain the trust of their targets. Once the threat actors build rapport over the course of the conversation, the attack moves to the next phase by sharing links that direct the victims to fake landing pages capable of harvesting their Google account credentials.
“Before sending the phishing link, threat actors ask the victim for their email address,” Check Point said. “This address is then pre-filled on the credential phishing page to increase credibility and mimic the appearance of a legitimate Google authentication flow.”
“The custom phishing kit […] closely imitates familiar login pages, like those from Google, using modern web technologies such as React-based Single Page Applications (SPA) and dynamic page routing. It also uses real-time WebSocket connections to send stolen data, and the design allows it to hide its code from additional scrutiny.”
The fake page is part of a custom phishing kit that can not only capture their credentials, but also two-factor authentication (2FA) codes, effectively facilitating 2FA relay attacks. The kit also incorporates a passive keylogger to record all keystrokes entered by the victim and exfiltrate them in the event the user abandons the process midway.
Some of the social engineering efforts have also involved the use of Google Sites domains to host bogus Google Meet pages with an image that mimics the legitimate meeting page. Clicking anywhere on the image directs the victim to phishing pages that trigger the authentication process.
“Educated Manticore continues to pose a persistent and high-impact threat, particularly to individuals in Israel during the escalation phase of the Iran-Israel conflict,” Check Point said.
“The group continues to operate steadily, characterized by aggressive spear-phishing, rapid setup of domains, subdomains, and infrastructure, and fast-paced takedowns when identified. This agility allows them to remain effective under heightened scrutiny.”
