What I came to understand is that the only people crazy enough to deploy or release a biological weapon into the community, knowing full well that the blowback would be extraordinary and would create a pandemic around the world, would be someone who had a death wish. Many terrorists fit that that category, so that is deeply unsettling. But that’s a smaller group.
And then you think about all the people—scientists, nation states, academic institutions—that are manipulating pathogens for greater virulence, for greater transmissibility in these BSL-3 and BSL-4 labs [Biosafety Level 4 is the highest security designation]. I mean, there are 3,600 of those labs around the world. There are not 3,600 terrorist organizations that I am aware of. So the chance for an accident is statistically far greater. That’s why I begin my scenario with a lab leak, and also because it’s happened before.
One can imagine a researcher sticking themself with a syringe at a BSL-4 lab and freaking out, humans being humans, and kind of going into denial and heading home.
One hundred percent—and as has happened. Then you have other examples, like [Nikolai] Ustinov, whom I wrote about in a little history lesson in the book, sticking himself with a deadly Marburg virus, from which there is no cure, and doing the good Soviet scientist thing, which is tell on himself, and then be left in a isolation ward behind sort of submarine-lock type doors to die a horrific death by hemorrhagic fever. Accidents happen.
You and I have both written on the risks of gain-of-function research, like reconstituting pandemic flu strains that can spread among ferrets—god help us if that ever got out. You write in the book that it was after 9/11, when someone was mailing around anthrax, when the riskiest research accelerated.
Yes, and I think it’s interesting. With anthrax, you’re a “dead-end host,” meaning if you breathe it in, it will kill you but it’s not transmissible. The anthrax wasn’t ever going to become a pandemic. It was meant to make people experience terror. But it’s very different when you’re talking about an airborne pathogen.
And so, flash forward to where we are now, with [advanced] genetic engineering, with gain of function research, with AI-enabled bio, and you have a situation whereby everything is on the table in terms of pandemic potential. You can tweak things. Scientists in a lab can work to create a pathogen that’s able to evade existing immunity, like the mouse pox experiment, or make something airborne, like the H5N1 ferret flu experiments. We are in a completely different world now.
I was taken aback when I called up that flu researcher, how arrogant he was: Of course you have to publish the sequence of this incredibly deadly thing. He didn’t think twice about it. There’s a hubris with some of these guys.
A hubris, or an elitism, where you talk down to the laymen because they are not scientists. As if they can’t make decisions about national security or public health because they are not scientists. I find that incredibly alarming. One of the things that’s been most impactful about my scenario books, both nuclear and bio, is that I have had subject-matter experts around the world, people who write treaties, the cardinals at the Vatican, diplomats at the United Nations, say to me: “Thank you for making this very simple to understand.”
