On 27 April, the government backed security certification scheme, Cyber Essentials v3.3, takes effect and multi-factor authentication (MFA) becomes a pass-or-fail requirement for the first time.
If a cloud service your organisation uses offers MFA and you have not enabled it, you fail. No discretion, no partial credit, no route to remediate inside the assessment cycle.
This is the right call. I want to say that clearly, because what follows is a problem with the implementation, not the policy. MFA is the single most effective control against credential-based attacks, and the scheme has needed to stop tolerating its absence for a long time. The National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC), part of GCHQ, which developed Cyber Essentials and certification company, IASME have got this decision right.
But in the assessments we have conducted this year, I have seen two organisations that will hit a wall on 27 April, and I do not think they are unusual.
Train company could not deploy MFA
The first is a train operating company in the South East. Station operations rooms run on shared terminals where staff rotate through shifts in time-critical conditions. A transport union raised formal concerns that MFA would introduce delays at the keyboard that could affect train operations and, in their view, the safety of train movements.
The company listened and chose not to enable MFA in those environments. Under v3.2 they passed, with the relevant questions marked as non-compliant but not fatal. Under Cyber Essentials v3.3 they will fail.
Charity run by volunteers faces MFA hurdle
The second is a nationally known charity with hundreds of high street shops. The shops are staffed largely by volunteers many of whom work a few hours a week, and staff turnover is high.
The cost and management overhead of enrolling every volunteer onto MFA, using personal phones they may not have and authenticator apps they would not keep, was considered prohibitive. So MFA was never switched on. Same story: they passed under v3.2. Under v3.3 they fail.
Neither of these organisations is ignoring security. Both made considered decisions based on how their people actually work. The problem is not that they do not want to comply. It is that the standard toolkit of MFA methods, including SMS codes, authenticator apps on personal phones, and push notifications, does not fit a six-person shared terminal that has to be available in seconds, or a volunteer workforce that changes every week.
FIDO2 could offer solutions
The frustrating part is that there is a solution, and it is already proven in healthcare, manufacturing and retail. FIDO2 authentication delivered through NFC badge-taps lets a staff member authenticate in under two seconds: tap a badge, enter a short PIN, session opens.
It satisfies the MFA requirement by combining possession of the badge with knowledge of the PIN. It is faster than typing a password. Crucially, it is compliant, because each badge is enrolled as that individual’s unique FIDO2 credential, so the Cyber Essentials requirement for unique user accounts is met. Shared keys or shared PINs would not work. Individual badges do.
Need for better guidance
v3.3 explicitly recognises FIDO2 authenticators and passkeys as valid MFA methods. The compliance path is clear. What is missing is anyone telling the organisations most affected that this path exists.
That is the gap that must close. The NCSC and IASME have made the right policy decision; the scheme would be weaker without it.
But implementation guidance for shared-terminal, shift-based and high-turnover environments is thin, and these organisations are running out of time to find their way through it. Many of them hold Cyber Essentials because it is required for government contracts or in their supply chains; losing certification has a direct commercial cost.
The answer is not to soften the requirement. The answer is to make sure no one fails for lack of information about how to meet it.
Jonathan Krause is Founder and Managing Director of Forensic Control
